Erschienen:
Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2013
Erschienen in:NBER working paper series ; no. w19043
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.3386/w19043
Identifikator:
Reproduktionsnotiz:
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
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Beschreibung:
We present a two-armed bandit model of decision making under uncertainty where the expected return to investing in the "risky arm'' increases when choosing that arm and decreases when choosing the "safe'' arm. These dynamics are natural in applications such as human capital development, job search, and occupational choice. Using new insights from stochastic control, along with a monotonicity condition on the payoff dynamics, we show that optimal strategies in our model are stopping rules that can be characterized by an index which formally coincides with Gittins' index. Our result implies the indexability of a new class of "restless'' bandit models