Anmerkungen:
In: Academy of Management Journal, 62(1): 220-247, 2019. (Huang is the corresponding author.)
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2019 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Innovation activities create substantial firm value, but they are difficult to manage owing to agency risk which is commonly thought to result in shirking, hence underinvestment in innovation. However, agency risk can also create inefficient allocation of resources among innovation activities, on which the literature provided limited understanding. We examine an important outcome created by agency risk — that agents pursue the quantity of innovation at the expense of the novelty, and investigate how it is influenced by corporate and public governance. We theorize that improved corporate governance tools, including better alignment of agents' private incentives and stronger monitoring, and high-quality public governance reduce such agency risk in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, higher-quality public governance enhances the functioning of corporate governance tools in further reducing such agency risk in innovation. We test our theory in the context of Chinese SOEs that responded to state's pro-innovation policies relying disproportionately on quantifiable outcomes (e.g., patent counts) for assessing innovation performance. Our difference-in-differences estimates provide overall support for the hypotheses. These findings provide new insights on how agency risk affects innovation by distinguishing the consequences on quantity and novelty of innovation and on how conventional corporate governance tools shaping innovation is dependent on public governance