Beschreibung:
<jats:p>The following paper focuses upon what is possibly the most controversial passage in Kierkegaard's writings. On the basis of this passage Kierkegaard's notion of truth as ‘subjectivity’ has been interpreted as being ‘non-objective referential’, that is, as having severed itself from ‘eternal truth’ altogether, so that the emphasis in the question of truth is entirely upon the <jats:italic>relationship</jats:italic> a person has to what he thinks and that the object of the relationship is a matter of indifference. We shall defend here a reading of Kierkegaard in which the subjectivity that Kierkegaard defines as truth is entirely conditioned by its relation to a specific revelation of eternal truth. In line with this we will also interpret the passage at the centre of the controversy as an ‘impossible hypothetical’ used for the sake of making a provocation.</jats:p>