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Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of Sentences
Beteiligte:
Greimann, Dirk
Erschienen:
Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2021
Erschienen in:KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.1515/krt-2021-0014
ISSN:
2750-977X
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interpretation suggested by Quine’s recently published <jats:italic>Kant Lectures</jats:italic> from 1980 according to which his global structuralism is a semantic thesis that belongs to his theory of ontological reduction. It claims that a theory can always be reformulated in such a way that its <jats:italic>truth</jats:italic> does not presuppose the existence of the original objects, but only of some objects that can be considered as their proxies. Quine derives this claim from the principle of the semantic primacy of sentences, which is supposed to license the ontological reductions he uses to establish his global structuralism. It is argued that these reductions do not actually work because they do not account for some hidden ontological commitments that are not detected by his criterion of ontological commitment.</jats:p>