Wang, Li
[VerfasserIn]
;
Menkhoff, Lukas
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Schröder, Michael
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Xu, Xian
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Politicians' Promotion Incentives and Bank Risk Exposure in China
Erschienen in:ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper ; No. 15-026
Umfang:
1 Online-Ressource (54 p)
Sprache:
Englisch
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2620662
Identifikator:
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2015 erstellt
Beschreibung:
This paper shows that politicians' pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance incentive the riskier the respective local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds primarily for local banks which are under a certain degree of control of local politicians and it has increased with the release of recent stimulus packages requiring local co-financing