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Medientyp:
E-Artikel
Titel:
The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
Beteiligte:
Banks, Jeffrey S.;
Weingast, Barry R.
Erschienen:
University of Texas Press, 1992
Erschienen in:American Journal of Political Science
Sprache:
Englisch
ISSN:
0092-5853;
1540-5907
Entstehung:
Anmerkungen:
Beschreibung:
<p>We analyze a model of interest group influence where this influence arises from a group's ability to provide relevant information to political actors about regulatory performance. The model rests on three premises: (1) bureaucrats possess an informational advantage, vis-a-vis their political overseers, concerning policy relevant variables; (2) this informational advantage is potentially exploitable by the agency; and (3) politicians anticipate this exploitation and adapt to it in their design of agencies. We show that a major consequence of this anticipation and adaptation is service to organized interest groups.</p>