van Beest, Ilja
[VerfasserIn]
;
Steinel, Wolfgang
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft];
Murnighan, J. Keith
[Sonstige Person, Familie und Körperschaft]
Honesty Pays
: On the Benefits of Disclosing Information in Coalition Formation
Anmerkungen:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 9, 2008 erstellt
Beschreibung:
Research on deception in negotiation has regularly emphasized the benefits of not disclosing personal information because others may take advantage of those who are honest. In the current study we show that this advice may backfire in distributive multiparty negotiations in which individuals need to form a coalition to obtain payoffs. In Study 1, we show that participants fail to realize that they need to be an attractive coalition partner in order to be included in a coalition. Participants who were able to generate an excess of payoffs were only included in a coalition when all other players also were aware of this advantage. In Study 2 we went one step further and assessed the willingness to disclose information about one's potential earnings. Results showed that fairness motivations mediated the decision to disclose private information about potential earnings, and that those who told the truth made more attractive offers to their fellow coalition players